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A Study on Consumers' Learning Effect in the Price 
Reduction Auction: a case study of Gongtianxia 
 
Yanan Xu, Bo Yang 
*
, Rong Zhang, Pengfei Xie 
Information Institute, RENMIN UNIVERSITY of CHINA, Beijing 100872, China 
 
Abstract：GongTianXia’s "7 days shot" and "15 minutes shot" is a very typical online price reduction auction. By studying 
the learning effect of consumers in this online price reduction auction, this paper hopes to provide some suggestions for the 
formulation of marketing strategy of GongTianXia. Through the research of related literature and the deep analysis of 
consumer purchasing decision theory, the research problem is divided into two aspects. First, with the increase in the number 
of participants, whether the proceeds of the auction goods are gradually increasing. Second, with the increase in the number 
of participants, whether the grasp of the timing is more and more accurate. Through the statistical analysis of the auction data 
of GongTianXia, this paper verified the existence of consumer learning effect in the price reduction auction. 
 
Keywords：Price reduction auction; Learning effect; Consumer purchase decision theory 
 
1. INRODUCTION 
From the beginning of 2014, Gongtianxia.com carried out agricultural and sideline products 
price-reduction auctions, which were mainly divided into "7-day auction" and "15-minute auction" two types
[1]
. 
7-day auction gets new goods on shelf at 10 pm on the first day, and sets this time as 1
st
 day of the auction of 
this goods with the initial auction price. Then the auction price will be reduced to a certain price by the platform 
at 10 pm in the next 6 days, which happened only once at 10 o’clock. It is possible for consumers to bid the 
good at that certain price during this auction period until 10 pm of the next day. When auction comes to 10 pm 
of the seventh day, auction price will drop to 1 yuan for all goods. There is a special rule that the total amount of 
an auction good is limited, which means auction can be stopped in advance if all the auction goods are sold out. 
The rule of 15-minute auction is similar to 7-day auction. It differs from 7-day auction’s rule in the 
price-dropping interval, and the price will drop to 1 yuan at the last auction period. Both "7-day auction" and 
"15-minute auction" are 
1
an efficient marketing method to stimulate the consumers’ purchasing behavior
[1]
. 
The definition of Learning Effect is staffs can accumulate experience about product production, technical 
design or management during long-term production process in order to enhance their productivity and reduce 
average production cost
[3]
. Through rough observation of our collected data of Gongtianxia.com, we found one 
user of platform took a gradually higher bid and stayed stable on a particular price tier during his auction 
experience
[5]
. There still remains necessity to test whether a single user’s auction purchase behavior is 
significantly influenced by learning effect. We hope our research can analyze and explain the learning effect in 
this novel marketing mode, thus provide some suggestions on making marketing strategies for auction 
E-commerce platform. 
 
2. RESERCH CONTENT 
This paper aimed at research on the learning effect present by individual consumers in the price-reduction 
auction process of agricultural and sideline products, mainly expanded by the following two problems. 
The first problem is with the increase of the participating number of auctions, whether the auction gain is 
gradually increasing or not, which is represent by the difference between initial auction price (1
st
 price) and the 
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final bidding price
[3]
. In other words, consumer can decrease their final bidding price payment by choosing a 
higher auction tier, to get a larger auction gain. This issue aims at proving that there exists a learning effect in 
the auction of the agricultural and sideline products for consumers essentially. In order to show whether there is 
a learning effect, we have established a multiple linear regression model. For the linear regression model, we 
have added the appropriate control variables to make the results more reliable according to the relevant literature 
and theoretical research. And then the data and then detailed statistics and analysis to prove that in the 
agricultural and sideline products price reduction in the consumer whether there is a corresponding learning 
effect. 
The second one refers to the grasp accuracy of the bidding timing with the increasing participating times. 
We can also divide this problem into two issues. One is the estimation accuracy of the last auction tier (because 
auction will be stopped before 7
th
 tier if goods are sold out). The other is about the time length used for 
finalizing their bidding on a particular price tier
[3]
. Due to the limited amount of remaining goods, the faster a 
consumer bids for the good, the more possible he can finalize their bidding for this auction. 
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The price-reduction auction, also known as the Dutch auction and originated in the Dutch flower market, is 
a typical auction type for flower sales
[1]
. As for sales promotion, Ding and Guo (2005) attached importance to 
analysis on Dutch auction from economic perspective, and took advantage of empirical research
[1]
. Jennifer 
Neujahr and Qiao (2006) discussed the problems existed in the auction
[9]
. Zhang (2007) analyzed the existing 
situation and some unique characteristics of Chinese domestic flower auction market in detail, and summarized 
the shortcomings of it
[9]
. Qin (2012) systematically and comprehensively studied the law of possible price 
fluctuation in Chinese domestic agricultural auction market and the related great influencing factors
[13]
.  
Learning Effect dated back to 1930s. Wright (1936) found that the unit time of the production aircraft 
would be reduced by 20% when the aircraft production was doubled in the study of aircraft production costs
[8]
. 
For a relatively long period of time, studies of learning effects have been mostly concentrated in the production 
of manufacturing enterprises. Nowadays, the study of learning effect has been extended to many industry fields. 
In recent years, there has been some articles about the research on consumer behavior in online auctions affected 
by learning effect. PB Goes，GG Karuga，AK Tripathi (2012) set research object as consumer behavior in online 
auctions and explained the decision process by an experience model
[10]
. Their research found that consumers’ 
decision was influenced by auction desires, previous related experience and a few parameter design in auctions. 
H Zheng, KY Goh, KW Huang (2011) analyzed consumer behaviors under “1-cent auction” mode, and achieved 
optimization by adjusting limit conditions
[14]
. Ma (2014) constructed a mathematical model based on influence 
of learning effect made on enterprises’ promotion activities
[14]
. However, most related researches focused on 
learning effect on enterprise level instead of individual behaviors. 
 
4. CHANGES OF CONSUMERS’ BIDDING GAIN WITH THE INCREASE OF AUCTION 
PARTICIPATING TIMES 
Consumers generate learning effects in order to obtain a more favorable price advantage in the auction
[8]
. In 
the initial auction, due to restrictions on auction total amount and inadequate understanding of the auction, so 
consumers are willing to give up part of price advantage to grab inexpensive goods, that is, consumers might bid 
on a relatively low price tier (high price) from their beginning use of the auction E-commerce platform. With the 
increase in the number of auctions consumer had participated, consumers had a better understanding of the 
auction process, then he will try to adjust his own auction prices to increase their biding gain. We recognized 
this adjustment as an expression of auction learning effect. We built a multiple linear regression model in order 
to verify our basic hypothesis quantifiably and intuitively. 
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4.1 Variable selection 
Firstly, we decided on the selection of dependent and independent variables. Based on literature review, we 
knew learning effect made great effect on consumer’s auction behavior, so it could be verified if the auction 
behavior were influenced largely by previous bidding. As for consumer's auction behavior, the final bidding 
price is an important measure of consumer auction behavior. However, different goods have different prices, so 
it was not feasible to set the price directly as a variable. Considering the bidding rules of both 7-day auction and 
15-minute auction, we found standard seven price tiers could represent the auction prices of various goods, 
which simplified the standardized process. But as a typical categorical variable, it should not be applied to linear 
regression. As a result, we introduced price reduction extent, which seen as a bidding gain for consumer from 
another prospective. In summary, we set bidding gain (price reduction extent for purchased good in this time) in 
current auction as dependent variable, and bidding gain in previous auction. 
Secondly, suitable control variables contributed much to the accuracy of regression model, which is related 
to consumers’ bidding psychology. Consumer purchase decision-making theory refers to the evaluation and final 
selection of the properties of goods during the purchase process of a specific type of goods
[15]
. The whole 
process includes the determination of consumer needs, the emergence of the purchase motive, the analysis and 
selection of a variety of commodity purchase options, and following series of practical test after the purchase. 
The information available from the data collected on Gongtianxia E-commerce platform is primarily relevant to 
the marketing activities of the price-reduction auction. For the sake of the bidding gain obtained in each auction, 
all historical, current and future price were still the first consideration of consumers to determine their 
purchase
[17]
. As a result, we decided to add seven price-reduction extent to our model as control variables, which 
were processed in advantage of seven price tiers. 1
st
 price-reduction extent was equal to 0 constantly, so there 
were six price-reduction extents in total actually. In addition, total remaining amount is limited in one 
price-reduction auction, stimulating and reminding consumers to bid as soon as possible, so our research 
considered remaining number of goods as a control variable. Finally, according to the habits of consumers to 
buy goods through online E-commerce, whether set free for delivery or not, should be included into the linear 
regression as a control variable. 
 
4.2 Linear multiple regression model of consumer’s bidding gain 
We constructed following linear multiple regression model to test whether current consumer’s bidding gain 
is connected with the previous one on the basis of explanation in 4.1.  
           
         
0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5
5 6 6 7 7 8
, ,  * , , 1   * , ,   * , ,   * , ,  * , ,
 * , ,  * , ,  * , ,   * , , ,
BG i j t BG i j t PR i j t PR i j t PR i j t PR i j t
PR i j t PR i j t AMT i j t DEL i j i j t
     
    
      
    
(1) 
Among them, BG(i,j,t) means the bidding gain obtained by the consumeri bids for j
th
 kind of goods for the 
t
th
 time, while PRn(i,j,t) means the n
th
 price reduction extent when the consumeri bids for j
th
 kind of goods for the 
t
th
 time. AMT(i,j,t) and DEL(i,j) means the remaining amount of the goods and whether it was free for delivery 
when consumeri bids for j
th
 kind of goods for the t
th
 time. ε(i,j,t) is the random error.  
 
4.3 Regression result 
4.3.1 7-day auction mode 
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Table 1. Abstract of regression models 
















Sig. F  
1 .709a 0.502 0.502 0.1065168 0.502 4672.713 1 4628 0.000 
2 .765b 0.586 0.586 0.0971946 0.083 931.342 1 4627 0.000 
3 .774c 0.599 0.598 0.0956798 0.013 148.670 1 4626 0.000 
4 .776d 0.603 0.602 0.0952095 0.004 46.818 1 4625 0.000 
5 .777e 0.604 0.604 0.0950419 0.001 17.327 1 4624 0.000 
6 .778f 0.606 0.605 0.0948867 0.001 16.137 1 4623 0.000 
a. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1) 
b. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1), PR6 
c. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1), PR6, AMT 
d. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1), PR6, AMT,DEL 
e. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1), PR7, AMT,DEL,PR5 
f. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1), PR7, AMT,DEL,PR5, PR7 
 
Table 2. ANOVA analysis result 







Regression 53.016 1 53.016 4672.713 .000b 
Residual 52.509 4628 0.011 
  
Sum 105.524 4629 
   
2 
Regression 61.814 2 30.907 3271.693 .000c 
Residual 43.710 4627 0.009 
  
Sum 105.524 4629 
   
3 
Regression 63.175 3 21.058 2300.296 .000d 
Residual 42.349 4626 0.009 
  
Sum 105.524 4629 
   
4 
Regression 63.599 4 15.900 1754.014 .000e 
Residual 41.925 4625 0.009 
  
Sum 105.524 4629 
   
5 
Regression 63.756 5 12.751 1411.630 .000f 
Residual 41.768 4624 0.009 
  
Sum 105.524 4629 
   
6 
Regression 63.901 6 10.650 1182.898 .000g 
Residual 41.623 4623 0.009 
  
Sum 105.524 4629       
a. Dependent variable: BG(t) 
b. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1) 
c. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1), PR6 
d. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1), PR6, AMT 
e. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1), PR6, AMT,DEL 
f. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1), PR7, AMT,DEL,PR5 
g. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1), PR7, AMT,DEL,PR5, PR7 
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As shown in Table 1, we adopted a stepwise regression method, and the last bidding gain (BG(t-1)) was the 
first independent variable to enter the regression equation, earlier than several price reduction extents, remaining 
amount and free delivery or not
[17]
. And the contribution of last bidding gain made to the change of R
2
 is 
relatively largest among all variables, which indicated the last bidding gain (BG(t-1)) had the most important 
influence on current bidding gain earned at this time in 7-day auction mode. R
2 
increased gradually with the 
entrance of other control variables, and reached largest at the 6
th
 regression model. Through the ANOVA result 
shown in Table 2, the whole regression model is significant.  
 









  B Standard error Beta 
1 (Constant) 0.258 0.006   40.686 0.000 
 
BR(t-1) 0.650 0.010 0.709 68.357 0.000 




BR(t-1) 0.444 0.011 0.485 40.492 0.000 
 
PR6 0.455 0.015 0.365 30.518 0.000 




BR(t-1) 0.428 0.011 0.467 39.291 0.000 
 
PR6 0.551 0.017 0.442 33.087 0.000 
 
AMT 0.000 0.000 -0.132 -12.193 0.000 




BR(t-1) 0.416 0.011 0.453 37.844 0.000 
 
PR6 0.564 0.017 0.453 33.827 0.000 
 
AMT -9.7E-05 0.000 -0.108 -9.509 0.000 
 
DEL -0.023 0.003 -0.070 -6.842 0.000 




BR(t-1) 0.417 0.011 0.455 38.016 0.000 
 
PR6 0.759 0.050 0.610 15.262 0.000 
 
AMT 0.000 0.000 -0.112 -9.871 0.000 
 
DEL -0.028 0.004 -0.085 -7.855 0.000 
 
PR5 -0.227 0.055 -0.158 -4.163 0.000 




BR(t-1) 0.412 0.011 0.449 37.314 0.000 
 
PR6 0.806 0.051 0.648 15.801 0.000 
 
AMT 0.000 0.000 -0.122 -10.492 0.000 
 
DEL -0.037 0.004 -0.112 -8.802 0.000 
 
PR5 -0.278 0.056 -0.193 -4.967 0.000 
  PR7 0.412 0.103 0.047 4.017 0.000 
In addition, Table 3 summarized the coefficients of both independent and control variables on dependent 
variable. The relevance of the consumers’ current bidding gain with last bidding gain for the same kind of goods 






 price reduction extent was excluded from the 
regression model at last, which might be connected with the habit that consumers mostly showed much more 
concern with higher price tier (lower bidding price). Previous four price tiers did not present so much attraction 
for consumers. 
The Seventeenth Wuhan International Conference on E-Business－Changing Consumers in the Digital World       303 
Through Table 3, we got the linear regression model of 7-day auction mode (1). 
         
     
0 5 6 7, , 0.449* , , 1 0.197* , , 0.648* , , 0.047* , ,
–0.122* , , 0.112* , , ,
BG i j t BG i j t PR i j t PR i j t PR i j t
AMT i j t DEL i j i j t


     

(2) 
We found that the last bidding gain had a positive effect on current bidding gain, which indicated that 
consumers could adjust current auction behavior positively by learning from last auction. The larger the last 
bidding gain was, the greater current bidding gain was.  
 
Figure 1. Change of price tier with the increase of auction participating times (7-day) 
Next, we needed to focus on the changing trend of bidding price tier with the increase of consumers’ 
auction participating times. Considering the crossover learning impact between different types of goods and the 
limited amount of auction data, we would not categorize the type of auction goods in the research process of 
descriptive statistics. Finally we could describe the relationship between bidding price tier and auction 
participating times shown in Figure 1. In 7-day auction, consumers tended to bid on a gradually higher price tier 
to obtain lower bargain price at the beginning. When they took part in the auction for more than 4 times, average 
price tier started to become steady. Fluctuation would occur when times reached more than 10, which might be 
relevant to exposure of remaining amount and other external pressure. As a whole, bidding price tier presented a 
upward trend with the increase of consumers’ auction participating times in the 7-day auction. 
 
4.3.2 15-minute auction mode 
Table 4. Abstract of regression models 














Sig. F  
1 .816a 0.666 0.666 0.1160903 0.666 12822.825 1 6419 0.000 
2 .873b 0.761 0.761 0.0982156 0.095 2550.067 1 6418 0.000 
3 .876c 0.767 0.767 0.0970944 0.005 150.069 1 6417 0.000 
4 .878d 0.770 0.770 0.0963346 0.004 102.621 1 6416 0.000 
5 .879e 0.772 0.772 0.0960342 0.001 41.212 1 6415 0.000 
6 .879f 0.772 0.772 0.0959877 0.000 7.209 1 6414 0.007 
a. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1) d. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1), PR6, PR3, DEL 
b. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1), PR6 e. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1), PR6, PR3, DEL, PR7 
c. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1), PR6, PR3 f. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1), PR6, PR3, DEL, PR7, PR2 
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Table 5. ANOVA analysis result 







Regression 172.813 1 172.813 12822.825 .000b 
Residual 86.509 6419 0.013 
  
Sum 259.321 6420 
   
2 
Regression 197.411 2 98.706 10232.500 .000c 
Residual 61.910 6418 0.010 
  
Sum 259.321 6420 
   
3 
Regression 198.826 3 66.275 7030.134 .000d 
Residual 60.495 6417 0.009 
  
Sum 259.321 6420 
   
4 
Regression 199.779 4 49.945 5381.754 .000e 
Residual 59.543 6416 0.009 
  
Sum 259.321 6420 
   
5 
Regression 200.159 5 40.032 4340.629 .000f 
Residual 59.163 6415 0.009 
  
Sum 259.321 6420 
   
6 
Regression 200.225 6 33.371 3621.894 .000g 
Residual 59.096 6414 0.009 
  
Sum 259.321 6420       
a. Dependent variable: BG(t) 
b. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1) 
c. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1), PR6 
d. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1), PR6, PR3 
e. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1), PR6, PR3, DEL 
f. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1), PR6, PR3, DEL, PR7 
g. Estimation variable: (Constant), BG(t-1), PR6, PR3, DEL, PR7, PR2 
 
As shown in Table 4 and 5, last bidding gain is still the first variable entering the regression equation, 
earlier than price reduction extents, remaining amount and delivery condition, indicating the last bidding gain 
was the greatest influencing factor in 15-minute auction mode similarly. The goodness of fit of this linear 
regression model can reach 0.772, a little higher than that of 7-day auction mode, and the regression result is 
strongly significant. 
Table 6. Coefficient results 
Model 
  Non-standardized coefficient 
Standardized 
coefficient t Sig. 
  B Standard error Beta 
1 (Constant) 0.145 0.005  29.428 0.000 
 
BR(t-1) 0.812 0.007 0.816 113.238 0.000 
2 (Constant) -0.005 0.005  -0.986 0.324 
 
BR(t-1) 0.514 0.008 0.517 60.721 0.000 
 
PR6 0.520 0.010 0.430 50.498 0.000 
3 (Constant) -0.049 0.006  -7.926 0.000 
 
BR(t-1) 0.503 0.008 0.506 59.744 0.000 
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Model 
  Non-standardized coefficient 
Standardized 
coefficient t Sig. 
  B Standard error Beta 
 
PR6 0.705 0.018 0.583 38.650 0.000 
 
PR3 -0.192 0.016 -0.164 -12.250 0.000 
4 (Constant) -0.018 0.007  -2.604 0.009 
 
BR(t-1) 0.489 0.008 0.491 57.741 0.000 
 
PR6 0.676 0.018 0.558 36.811 0.000 
 
PR3 -0.164 0.016 -0.140 -10.388 0.000 
 
DEL -0.026 0.003 -0.064 -10.130 0.000 
5 (Constant) 0.387 0.063  6.097 0.000 
 
BR(t-1) 0.475 0.009 0.478 54.540 0.000 
 
PR6 0.622 0.020 0.514 30.934 0.000 
 
PR3 -0.115 0.018 -0.098 -6.569 0.000 
 
DEL -0.028 0.003 -0.070 -11.038 0.000 
 
PR7 -0.392 0.061 -0.047 -6.420 0.000 
6 (Constant) 0.373 0.064  5.863 0.000 
 
BR(t-1) 0.476 0.009 0.479 54.632 0.000 
 
PR6 0.658 0.024 0.544 27.256 0.000 
 
PR3 -0.253 0.054 -0.215 -4.661 0.000 
 
DEL -0.030 0.003 -0.074 -11.362 0.000 
 
PR7 -0.374 0.061 -0.045 -6.103 0.000 
  PR2 0.102 0.038 0.093 2.685 0.007 
 
We can conclude that last bidding gain significantly affect current bidding gain positively in consumers’ 




 price reduction 
extent did not pass the test, which might related to the auction scenario where consumers paid more attention to 
the starting and ending stage of the auction due to the high-valued property of goods in 15-minute auction. The 
linear regression equation is: 
         
     
0 6
7
2 3, , 0.479* , , 1 0.093* , , 0.215* , , 0.544* , ,
0.045* , , 0.074* , , ,
BG i j t BG i j t PR i j t PR i j t PR i j t
PR i j t DEL i j i j t






Figure 2. Change of price tier with the increase of auction participating times (15-minute) 
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Comparing Figure 1 and Figure 2, we found the very similar trend of bidding price tier with the increase of 
consumers’ auction participating times in the 15-minute auction, which went upward firstly and then kept steady. 
However, the steady pattern appeared after 6 times, later than that in 7-day, 4 times. 
 
5. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF CONSUMERS’ GRASP ACCURACY OF THE BIDDING TIMING 
After the linear regression model, we also wanted to study the trend of consumers' grasp accuracy of the 
bidding timing as the number of auction participating times increase. Because the linear regression model can 
only prove that the consumer's last auction behavior significantly affect the current auction behavior, thus 
proving the existence of consumer learning effect, but it cannot clearly describe the consumer's chosen bidding 
price tier with the increasing number of auction times. Descriptive statistic method is primarily used for 
statistical analysis for a situation or data as a whole or a potential connection between them. Therefore, our 
research also needs to take advantage of this method in order to see whether consumers can grasp the bidding 
timing more and more accurately when times of participating auctions increase.  
Descriptive analysis is divided into two parts: First, we studied the consumer's grasp accuracy of the final 
price tier (the price tier when all auction goods have been sold out) for the auction. Second, we did some 
descriptive research on the bidding time from the beginning of the auction at the final price tier. 
 
 
Figure 3. Consumer's grasp accuracy of the final price tier (7-day / 15-minute) 
 
We can see that in both 2 auction modes, with the increase of the number of consumers’ participating 
auctions, consumers’ forecast or grasp for the final price tier in the auction was more and more accurate until it 
arrived at a relatively stable certain level. The curve also complied with the typical learning curve mentioned in 
the previous introduction. The above figure illustrates the existence of the consumers’ learning effect in the price 
reduction auction of agricultural and sideline products from the view of the consumer's grasp accuracy of the 
final auction price tier. 
Secondly, we were going to verify that with the increase in the number of auction participating times, 
consumers’ bidding reaction time would be shortened or not. The question is raised because the number of 
goods which sold at a gradually reduced price is limited. This limit probably led to a large number of consumers 
to bid at the same price tier when auction went to a tipping point, and only the consumers with shorter reaction 
time was likely to bid the goods successfully. 
After extracting the starting time and the consumers’ bidding time at the final price tier, we calculated the 


























1 2 3 4 5 6 
Auction participating times 
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Figure 4. Consumer's auction reaction time span in the final price tier (7-day / 15-minute) 
In the 7-day auction, with the increase in the number of auction participating times, the consumers’ average 
auction reaction time span was indeed going down, that is, consumers grasped the bidding timing increasingly 
accurately. Although there’s an increase from the first to the third participating time, the existence of such a 
fluctuation is mainly because of a certain degree of randomness in the first two times. The overall trend is 
declining, improving the learning effect on consumers’ grasp of bidding time. 
However, in the 15-minute auction, the consumer's auction reaction time span increases as the number of 
auction participating times increased. This result was somehow inconsistent with our guess and 7-day auction 
result. We attributed the possible reason to the much shorter auction interval compared with 7–day mode and 
consumer's personal bidding features. For example, auction reaction time spans of consumer A were 9,8 and 7 
minutes and so on, and those of consumer B were 5,4 and 3 minutes. If A participated more than 3 auctions, and 
B did not, then the results will show the 4
th
 average auction time is high. So we adopted an enhanced data 
processing method, which was to standardize reaction time span according to that of the first auction 
participating experience for each single consumer, as shown in formula (4) as below. RTSi,t means the reaction 
time span in the t
th 
participating experience of the i
th
 consumer. And we could draw Figure 4 to describe the 












  (4) 
 
Figure 5. Processed consumer's auction reaction time span in the final price tier (15-minute) 
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From the above Figure 5, we can see that the consumer's auction time span decreases with the increase in 
the number of auction participating times, proving the existence of consumers’ learning effect for grasping final 




6. Conclusion and Prospects  
 
 6.1 Research conclusions 
This paper analyzed and summarized the collected data, and gives the relevant verification results for the 
two questions raised at the beginning of the study. Now, we summarize them as follows. 
(1) We validated the presence of consumers’ learning effects in both 7-day and 15-minute auction by linear 
regression model, which showed last bidding gain had significantly positive impact on current bidding gain with 
consideration of other control variable factors.  
(2) We verified the consumer's auction timing grasp accuracy would be improved with the increase in the 
number of auction participating times. This conclusion can be reflect in more accurate grasp of the final price 
tier and shorter reaction time span when consumers take part in more auctions. 
 
6.2 Research contributions 
The contribution of this paper is divided into two parts. The first part is the theoretical contribution. This 
article introduced the learning effect to the online price reduction auction of agricultural and sideline products in 
the E-commerce platform, which fills the blank of relevant research field.  
The second part is about practical contribution. This paper confirms the existence of consumer learning 
effect in the price reduction auction of agricultural and sideline products from two prospective, which especially 
reflected in the promoted bidding gain of consumers. This finding can potentially provide referential suggestions 
for price-reduction auction E-commerce platform to concern more about this learning effect in pricing strategy 
and auction scheme design. 
 
6.3 Research prospects 
(1) To improve the data information required for the study 
Because the data information we collected is limited in consumers’ personal information details, we hope 
to follow up and collect more complete data information for further study. 
(2) To promote the experimental results of this study 
Because this article is mainly carried out on the platform provided by Gongtianxia.com, so it is still 
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